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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
 
 Two homeowners allegedly treated their property as a 
junkyard.  This resulted in misdemeanor criminal charges 
against one of the homeowners for creating a public nuisance.  
The surrounding borough sought to clean up the property while 
the charges were pending, and a Pennsylvania state court judge 
authorized the borough to do so after giving the homeowner a 
brief window to collect any belongings he wished to keep.  The 
homeowners failed to retrieve their possessions during this 
window, and thereafter the borough and other affiliated entities 
hauled away the vehicles and other items that were strewn 
throughout the yard. In an effort to obtain damages 
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compensating them for their seized property, the homeowners 
filed suit in federal court, alleging violations of the United 
States Constitution and state law. 
 
 The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding it 
lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which 
precludes federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction 
over appeals from unfavorable state court judgments—
typically a task reserved for the United States Supreme Court.  
But that Court has repeatedly emphasized that the doctrine is a 
narrow one that defeats federal subject-matter jurisdiction only 
under limited circumstances.  And we have a precise four-
pronged inquiry for when Rooker-Feldman should be invoked.  
When even one of the four prongs is not satisfied, it is not 
proper to dismiss on Rooker-Feldman grounds.  Because this 
case does not satisfy all four prongs, we reverse.  
  
 In so holding, we do not suggest that federal cases 
implicating matters previously litigated in state court should 
automatically survive a motion to dismiss.  Far from it: there 
are many other principles, including claim and issue 
preclusion, that may doom such federal claims.  But many of 
those principles are non-jurisdictional, and courts should be 
wary of finding a Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional issue where 
none exists. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Timothy E. Vuyanich and his mother, Carol L. 
Vuyanich, reside at a property in Smithton, Pennsylvania they 
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own jointly.1  Their property straddles two municipal 
corporations in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania: 
Smithton Borough (the “Borough”) and South Huntingdon 
Township (the “Township”).  The latter gave the former 
jurisdiction to enforce its ordinances on the Vuyanich property.   
 
In July 2018, the Borough brought misdemeanor 
criminal charges against Timothy for abandoning inoperable 
vehicles, old appliances, and other trash on and around his 
property, in violation of local ordinances and state statutes.  
This was not Timothy’s first run-in with local authorities; he 
had received multiple prior citations for keeping his motor 
vehicles in a nuisance condition but had allegedly refused to 
dispose of them.  Borough officials claim the property had been 
in an “offensive condition” since at least 2014, and that 
neighbors had complained the “junk” smelled bad, attracted 
snakes and rats, presented dangers to small children, and was 
an eyesore that might lower the value of their homes.  App. at 
92.   
 
Apparently impatient to have the property cleaned 
without waiting “months and months for the criminal charges 
to work their way through court,” the Borough and the District 
Attorney’s office agreed to seek the state criminal court’s 
assistance in the meantime to get the job done.  App. at 99–
100.  The Vuyaniches’ complaint references minutes from a 
January 2019 meeting at which the Borough council apparently 
“talked about not telling Vuyanich what is happening 
beforehand, so that he doesn’t remove items.”  App. at 34, 84.   
 
1 Because Timothy and Carol share a last name, we use their 
first names when referring to them individually and refer to 




In June 2019, a state court judge held a status 
conference on Timothy’s criminal case, at which Timothy, his 
public defender, an assistant district attorney, and Borough 
police chief Michael R. Natale appeared.  The parties discussed 
the best means for cleaning up the property—a topic Timothy 
claims he was not adequately warned would be discussed.  
Natale represented that, “under the [B]orough ordinance that 
[Timothy] was originally cited for, the [B]orough has full 
authority to move in immediately and remediate the problem.”  
App. at 121.  The public defender told the judge Timothy 
needed more time to remove the items he wished to keep, in 
part because he was in poor health and his mobility was 
limited, and the judge agreed he would have 20 days to do so.  
But the judge also stated that, after the expiration of 20 days, 
“the [B]orough will be authorized to go in and start the clean 
up process.”  App. at 124.   
After the hearing, the state court judge issued an order 
(the “June 18, 2019 order”) continuing the criminal case for 60 
days.  It explained that this additional time was needed for a 
Borough “contractor to finish clean-up of [the] property [and] 
to determine [the] total cost” Timothy owed for the clean-up 
effort.  App. at 127.  It also provided that Timothy had “20 days 
to remove his personal items from [the] property.”  Id.  It was 
silent, however, as to which items the Borough was authorized 
to seize and whether those items could be seized permanently 
or just temporarily. 
 
On July 9, 2019, 21 days after the state court hearing, 
the Borough began cleaning the property without the 
Vuyaniches’ permission or a warrant.  The cleanup effort 
continued until early October 2019.  Natale and Ralph Marsico, 
Jr. of the Borough Police Department, along with Township 
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Supervisors Eddie Troupe, Matthew Jennewine, and Richard 
Gates, allegedly participated in this effort, and contractors Dale 
Cooper, Harry F. Thompson’s Garage, R&R Auto Recycling, 
Jarvis Auto & Truck Salvage, and Marsh Auto Salvage, Inc. 
were hired to haul away the debris strewn throughout the yard.2   
 
The Vuyaniches take issue not only with this 
“intrusion[],”  App. at 65, but also with the manner in which 
the cleanup was conducted.  They claim some of the 
Defendants entered the “curtilage”3 area of their yard, coming 
close to their dwelling, “physically contacting” their private 
shed, and ignoring the many “no trespassing” signs posted 
throughout the property.  App. at 46.  The Vuyaniches further 
allege Natale told some of the Defendants they could keep, sell, 
use, scrap, or destroy the items seized from the property 
without creating an inventory showing which items had resale 
value or had been destroyed.  At least one of the Defendants 
was apparently able to obtain a small sum ($110) for scrap 
metal removed from the property. 
 
Believing some of the removed items to be valuable, the 
Vuyaniches sent a cease-and-desist letter to a subset of the 
Defendants in July 2019, threatening to file a federal suit unless 
the Borough compensated them.  An attorney for the Borough 
responded that they would not get even “one cent.”  App. at 
152.  In response, the Vuyaniches made good on their threat, 
filing a federal suit in October 2019 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
 
2 We refer to this group collectively as “Defendants.” 
3 The “curtilage” is “the area immediately surrounding and 
associated with the home.”  Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 
(2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Amendments alongside state law claims for conversion and 
trespass.   
 
Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint, 
which the District Court granted in April 2020, holding that it 
lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  The 
Vuyaniches moved to alter the judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(e), which the District Court denied.  The 
Vuyaniches then appealed to us.  Shortly thereafter, in May 
2020, Timothy was convicted of the public nuisance charge 
and ordered to pay $5,100 in restitution for the cost of cleaning 
up his property. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over 
the Vuyaniches’ § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  We discuss the issue of our 
jurisdiction below, but to the extent we have subject-matter 
jurisdiction, we exercise it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Great W. 
Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 
n.3 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 
628 (2002) (“[A] federal court always has jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction.”).  We exercise fresh review 
over the District Court’s dismissal of the suit under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d 
at 163.4 
 
4 The Vuyaniches also appeal the District Court’s denial of 
their motion to alter the judgment under Rule 59, which we 
review for abuse of discretion except for “matters of law, 




III. Legal Background 
“In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows 
a state suit, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibits the district 
court from exercising jurisdiction.”  Id. at 163–64.  The 
doctrine stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which “vests authority 
to review a state court’s judgment solely in th[e] [United States 
Supreme] Court.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005).  The Supreme Court has 
relied on this doctrine to defeat federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction in only two cases, from which it derives its name: 
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
(1983).  Both cases were “essentially appeals from state-court 
judgments.”  Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 165.  
 
In the years following Rooker and Feldman, federal 
courts sometimes blurred the lines between that doctrine and 
the principles of issue and claim preclusion.  The latter two 
principles prevent a plaintiff from relitigating issues that were 
(and claims that were or could have been) litigated and 
resolved in a prior state court judgment.  See, e.g., Marran v. 
Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 152 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
Rooker-Feldman prevents “relitigating in federal court the 
issues decided in a state court”). 
 
 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2001).  
However, because we reverse the District Court’s dismissal of 
the case in the first instance, we need not address further the 
denial of the Rule 59 motion. 
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Troubled by these developments, in 2005 the Supreme 
Court observed that lower federal courts had “extend[ed]” the 
doctrine “beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman 
cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court 
jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state 
courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion 
law under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.”  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283.  
It therefore unanimously reined in Rooker-Feldman, making 
clear it does not defeat jurisdiction “simply because a party 
attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated 
in state court” or even presents a claim that “denies a legal 
conclusion” a state court has reached.  Id. at 293 (citation 
omitted).  Nor is Rooker-Feldman coterminous with “[c]omity 
or abstention doctrines.”  Id. at 292.  Instead, the Court held, 
the doctrine “is confined to cases of the kind from which [it] 
acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers 
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”  
Id. at 284.  Those cases occupy a “narrow ground.”  Id.; see 
also Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 
1279, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2018) (Newsom, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s Exxon decision is best understood as 
having narrowed what has been called the ‘so-called Rooker-
Feldman doctrine,’ . . . to its barest essence.”) (internal citation 
omitted).5   
 
5 After Exxon-Mobil, the late Justice Stevens suggested 
Rooker-Feldman was defunct altogether.  See Marshall v. 
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 318 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(arguing that an unrelated doctrine should be given “a decent 




As the Supreme Court later explained, the distinction 
between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion is important because 
 
Congress has directed federal courts to look principally 
to state law in deciding what effect to give state-court 
judgments. Incorporation of preclusion principles 
into Rooker–Feldman risks turning that limited doctrine 
into a uniform federal rule governing the preclusive 
effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full 
Faith and Credit Act. 
 
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (emphasis in 
original).  And Rooker-Feldman, unlike claim and issue 
preclusion, implicates a federal court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction, meaning it cannot be forfeited or waived, see 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), and courts 
must evaluate its applicability sua sponte if it is a concern, see 
Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
We have translated the Supreme Court’s approach to 
Rooker-Feldman into a four-pronged inquiry.  To trigger the 
doctrine, the following requirements must be met: “(1) the 
federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complains 
of injuries caused by the state-court judgments’; (3) those 
judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and 
(4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject 
the state judgments.”  Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 
(alterations omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).  
We have described Prongs 2 and 4 as the “key requirements,” 
 
Feldman doctrine”).  However, the Supreme Court has not 
explicitly abolished it.   
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id. at 168, but only meeting all four requirements prevents a 
district court from exercising jurisdiction under Rooker-
Feldman.  We focus primarily on Prongs 2 and 4, neither of 




A. Prong 2 
 To repeat, Prong 2 requires a plaintiff to “complain[] of 
injuries caused by the state-court judgments.”  Great W. 
Mining, 615 F.3d at 166.  This requirement “may also be 
thought of as an inquiry into the source of the plaintiff’s 
injury.”  Id.  To deprive the court of jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s 
injury must actually be “produced by a state-court judgment 
and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by 
it.”  Id. at 167 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
 Any injury Timothy and Carol suffered was not “caused 
by” a state court judgment.6  As an initial matter, Natale, the 
Borough police chief, represented to the state court judge that 
the Borough had preexisting authority under a Borough 
 
6 The Vuyaniches argue the state court’s June 18, 2019 order 
was not a “judgment” at all because it was an interlocutory 
order issued before Timothy’s conviction and did not satisfy 
the “practical finality approach” we adopted in Malhan v. Sec’y 
United States Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 460 (3d Cir. 2019).  
We need not address this issue because even assuming, without 
deciding, that the order was an effectively final judgment, it 




ordinance to seize at least some of the Vuyaniches’ property.  
It is not clear this was true; Natale previously sent an internal 
email suggesting he believed the Borough could only clean up 
the property after obtaining permission from Timothy or a state 
court.  However, Natale’s position before the state court was at 
least defensible: a local ordinance facially permits the 
Borough, when confronted with vehicles on private property 
that have remained in nuisance condition despite notice of the 
problem to the owner, “to correct the conditions” by 
“enter[ing] upon the offending premises.”  App. at 182.  
Accordingly, if the Vuyaniches received the requisite notice, 
the Borough could arguably have removed at least the 
inoperative vehicles absent any action from the state court.   
 
But even if the Borough lacked independent authority 
to seize the Vuyaniches’ property, the state court is best viewed 
as having “acquiesced in” or “ratified” the Borough’s seizure 
of the property rather than having “produced” it.  Great W. 
Mining, 615 F.3d at 167.  The court did not order the Borough 
to take the Vuyaniches’ property or give any specific 
instructions on how the Defendants could go about the clean-
up project.  Indeed, to the extent the state court played any role 
in shaping the ultimate cleanup effort, it was to the 
Vuyaniches’ benefit: Natale suggested the Borough would like 
to begin cleaning up the property immediately, but the court 
granted the request of Timothy’s counsel for an additional 20 
days to remove any valued items from the yard.  App. at 118 
(Public Defender: “I’ve been urging [Timothy] to cooperate, 
and he said that he will do that.  We’re just looking . . . for more 
time to see if we can solve this problem”); App at 122 (Judge: 
“So I’m telling [the Borough], you’re not authorized to go in 
there until at least day 21.”).  And the actions with which the 
Vuyaniches principally take issue—springing the cleanup 
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request on Timothy at a status hearing without adequate prior 
notice, trespassing in the “curtilage” area of the Vuyaniches’ 
yard, interfering with their private shed, permanently 
destroying or selling their property for a profit without keeping 
an inventory of the items sold or destroyed, and refusing to 
provide any compensation for the seized property—are 
traceable to Defendants alone.  “When . . . a federal plaintiff 
asserts injury caused by the defendant’s actions and not by the 
state-court judgment, Rooker–Feldman is not a bar to federal 
jurisdiction.”  Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 167; see also Van 
Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 893 (6th 
Cir. 2020) (concluding Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable 
because the plaintiff’s “injuries . . . did not arise from the [state 
court’s] writs of garnishment by themselves,” but rather from 
the defendants’ “actions in tallying the amount of relief 
requested”); Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar jurisdiction because 
the plaintiff did not “seek[] redress for an injury caused by the 
state-court decision itself . . . but rather for injuries caused by 
the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent conduct in prosecuting” 
the state court case against him) (internal citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original).   
 
At bottom, any injuries the Vuyaniches may have 
suffered were caused by the Defendants, not the state court.  
Accordingly, Prong 2 of Rooker-Feldman does not apply.7 
 
7 The Vuyaniches urge us to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s 
position that “[a] claim about conduct occurring after a state 
court decision . . . cannot be barred under Rooker–Feldman.”  
Target Media Partners, 881 F.3d at 1286.  We decline to adopt 
any such blanket temporal rule.  The timing of the plaintiff’s 




B. Prong 4 
Even if Prong 2 were satisfied, Rooker-Feldman would 
still not bar jurisdiction because this case does not meet the 
requirements of Prong 4.  To refresh, that prong requires a 
plaintiff to “invit[e] the district court to review and reject [a] 
state judgment[].”8  Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166.  The 
Vuyaniches did not invite the District Court to do so. 
 
“When the plaintiff attempts to litigate previously 
litigated matters, the federal court has jurisdiction as long as 
the federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, even if 
that claim denies a legal conclusion reached by the state court.”  
In re Philadelphia Ent. & Dev. Partners, 879 F.3d 492, 500 
(3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 169) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “In other words, if the 
federal court’s review does not concern ‘the bona fides of the 
prior judgment,’ the federal court ‘is not conducting 
[prohibited] appellate review’” even if “the claim for relief if 
granted would as a practical matter undermine a valid state 
 
167, but that a plaintiff’s injury is caused by conduct occurring 
after a state court decision is not on its own dispositive to the 
Prong 2 analysis.  It is easy to imagine scenarios in which this 
prong of Rooker-Feldman could be satisfied even when some 
of the conduct at issue took place after a state court decision—
for example, when a state court explicitly ordered defendants 
to take the precise action that later gave rise to the plaintiff’s 
claims, and the plaintiff asks the district court to vacate the 
state court judgment ordering that action. 
8 Again, we assume without deciding that the June 18, 2019 
order was a “judgment.” 
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court order.”  Id. at 500, 503 (quoting Great W. Mining, 615 
F.3d at 169). 
 
Here, the Vuyaniches have presented the requisite 
“independent claim[s]”: they have challenged the Defendants’ 
actions as unconstitutional and tortious.  The District Court 
could have ruled on these claims without conducting appellate 
review of the June 18, 2019 order.  For example, without 
reviewing or rejecting the state court order, that Court could 
have held unconstitutional the ordinance of the Borough 
ostensibly authorizing it to seize the Vuyaniches’ property.  
See Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 168 (noting that declaring a 
statute unconstitutional would not “amount to appellate 
reversal or modification of a valid state court decree” relying 
on that statute).  Similarly, without touching the underlying 
state court order, the District Court could have concluded the 
Borough carried out the clean-up in an unconstitutional or 
tortious way.  It is of no consequence that these conclusions 
might, “as a practical matter[,] undermine” the efficacy of the 
state court order.  In re Philadelphia Ent., 879 F.3d at 503. 
 
To be sure, the Vuyaniches’ federal complaint asserts 
that the state court’s order was “invalid.”  See, e.g., App. at 39, 
40, 57.  But doing so remains insufficient, on its own, to trigger 
Rooker-Feldman.  Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 171.  The 
Vuyaniches are “not merely contending that the state-court 
decision[] w[as] incorrect or that [it was] in violation of the 
Constitution.  Instead, [they] claim[] that people involved in 
the decision violated some independent right.”  Id. at 172 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  And 
importantly, the Vuyaniches did not ask the District Court to 
overturn the June 18, 2019 state-court order, but rather sought 
damages for the actions Defendants took under the guise of 
17 
 
implementing that order.  See id. at 173 (“[W]hile [plaintiff’s] 
claim for damages may require review of state-court judgments 
and even a conclusion that they were erroneous, those 
judgments would not have to be rejected or overruled for Great 
Western to prevail.”).  The complaint raises the alleged 
invalidity of the state court’s order only to assert that the 
document does not provide “lawful justification” for 
Defendants’ actions or a “legally permissible substitute for a 
warrant issued upon probable cause.”  App. at 57, 70.  At most, 
the complaint contends that the state court order offers 
Defendants no legal safe harbor.  But the Vuyaniches bring no 
direct challenge to the state court order itself.   
 
In this respect, this case stands in stark contrast to the 
Rooker and Feldman decisions.  In the former, the plaintiff 
asked the district court to declare a state court’s judgment “null 
and void.” 263 U.S. at 414.  And in Feldman, parties who had 
unsuccessfully petitioned the District of Columbia’s highest 
court to waive certain bar requirements “commenced a federal-
court action against the very court that had rejected their 
applications.”  Exxon-Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283.9  Unlike in those 
cases, the relief requested in our case—money damages for the 
Defendants’ allegedly overzealous cleanup efforts—does not 
 
9 Notably, even in the Feldman case itself, the Supreme Court 
declined to apply a jurisdictional bar to all of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.  Instead, it concluded that while the district court lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
state court’s specific application of the bar requirements, it 
retained jurisdiction to the extent plaintiffs “mounted a general 
challenge to the constitutionality of” the relevant bar 
requirements.  Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483. 
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invite the District Court to review and reject a state court 
judgment.   
 
C. Prong 1 
Although the failure to satisfy either Prong 2 or Prong 4 
dooms Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument, we also take 
the opportunity to recognize an abrogation of the law the 
District Court relied on to hold that Prong 1 bars Carol’s 
claim.10  Carol did not lose in state court; she was not even a 
party to the criminal proceeding against Timothy or to the state 
court’s June 18, 2019 order.  The District Court concluded this 
fact was irrelevant, relying on our decision in Marran v. 
Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), which held that 
“Rooker-Feldman bars actions brought by parties in privity 
with the parties in the state action.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Because Timothy and Carol own their property as joint tenants 
and had an apparently equal claim to the personal effects 
removed during the cleanup effort, the District Court 
concluded they were in privity and that Rooker-Feldman 
barred Carol’s claims as well. 
 
We disagree with that conclusion.  Although the Court 
correctly characterized our decision in Marran, the Supreme 
Court partially abrogated that holding in Lance v. Dennis by 
concluding that “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar 
actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply 
because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be 
 
10 Given our holding on the “key requirements” of Rooker-
Feldman (Prongs 2 and 4), we need not otherwise analyze 
Prong 1 (with respect to Timothy) or Prong 3. 
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considered in privity with a party to the judgment.”  546 U.S. 
at 466. 
 
Lance governs here.  To be sure, it left open the 
possibility that Rooker-Feldman might sometimes prevent 
federal claims from a party not named in an earlier state 
proceeding, like when an “estate takes a de facto appeal in a 
district court of an earlier state decision involving [a] 
decedent.”  Id. n.2.  But Rooker-Feldman does not bar Carol’s 
claim “simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, [she] 
could be considered in privity with” Timothy.  Id. 
 
D. Alternative Bases for Dismissal 
Defendants argue that even if Rooker-Feldman poses no 
bar to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, we should affirm 
dismissal of the case on an alternative ground: because the 
Vuyaniches’ claims are barred by issue preclusion and under 
the doctrine articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 
486–87 (1994), which provides that a plaintiff may not recover 
damages under § 1983 if doing so would imply the invalidity 
of a prior conviction that has not otherwise been overturned.  
The District Court did not reach this alternative, and indeed 
Timothy was not convicted until after the District Court 
dismissed the case.   
 
“We ordinarily decline to consider issues not decided by 
a district court, choosing instead to allow that court to consider 
them in the first instance.”  Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros 
Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010).  There is no reason 
to depart from that principle here.  See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 
U.S. 521, 533 n.11 (2011) (“[Q]uestions of preclusion 
unresolved below are ‘best left for full airing and decision on 
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remand.’”) (quoting Lance, 546 U.S. at 467 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring)). 
 
Although “all courts ‘have an independent obligation to 
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,’” Great 
W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 163 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)), we need not address 
Defendants’ alternative preclusion arguments in the first 
instance because preclusion “is not a jurisdictional matter,”  
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293.  And as panels of our Court have 
stated in not precedential opinions, Heck does not present 
jurisdictional issues either.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. New Jersey State 
Police, 747 F. App’x 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2018); Bolick v. Sacavage, 
617 F. App’x 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Reaves v. 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 580 F. App’x 49, 54 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 
Importantly, the Heck decision contains no 
jurisdictional language.  Instead, it holds that a “§ 1983 cause 
of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional 
conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or 
sentence has been invalidated.”  Heck, 512 U.S. at 489–90; see 
also Teagan v. City of McDonough, 949 F.3d 670, 678 (11th 
Cir. 2020) (noting, in a dictum, that “the Supreme Court’s own 
language suggests that Heck deprives the plaintiff of a cause of 
action—not that it deprives a court of jurisdiction”).  
Consistent with this approach, at least one of our sister circuits 
has treated Heck as an affirmative defense rather than a 
jurisdictional rule.  See Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 
(7th Cir. 1999) (“The failure to plead the Heck defense in a 
timely fashion was a waiver[.]”); but see O’Brien v. Town of 
Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 529 (1st Cir. 2019) (stating, without 
analysis, that “[w]hether Heck bars § 1983 claims is a 
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jurisdictional question”).  As the Ninth Circuit has opined, 
“compliance with Heck most closely resembles the mandatory 
administrative exhaustion of [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 
claims, which constitutes an affirmative defense and not a 
pleading requirement.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016).  We agree 
that Heck does not implicate a federal court’s jurisdiction; thus 
there is no need to reach Defendants’ Heck argument at this 
time.  The District Court is free to consider it and Defendants’ 
other alternative arguments for dismissal as appropriate on 
remand.11   
* * * * *  
The Supreme Court has made clear that Rooker-
Feldman is a limited doctrine that must not be applied outside 
of a precise, narrow set of circumstances.  Those circumstances 
are not present here, and we therefore reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal of the case and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
11 We also deny the parties’ motions to file a supplemental 
appendix and briefing on these alternative issues.  We note the 
Vuyaniches already included in the joint appendix some of the 
documents supporting Timothy’s state court conviction, even 
though it is well established that we consult materials outside 
the District Court record only in “exceptional circumstances.”  
Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 
226 (3d Cir. 2009).  Although we have taken judicial notice of 
Timothy’s conviction, we have not otherwise considered these 
extra-record materials during this appeal. 
